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How Many Children? A Comparison of the Influence 
of Individual and Country-Level Predictors on Female
Childbearing Behavior in 25 OECD Countries 
MANDY BOEHNKE1
MICHAEL FELDHAUS2
Utilizing a multi-level analytic approach (HLM), the present study analyzes
reasons for variations in the number of children among 4069 25- to 34-year old
women in 25 OECD countries, surveyed in the World Value Survey (WVS).
Educational attainment, household income, age, and pro-child attitudes were included as individual-level
predictors, whereas on the country-level, individualism and masculinity (as conceptualized by Hofstede),
the Human Development Index (HDI), marriages rates, female employment rates, and early childcare
enrolment rates were used as predictors. On the individual level, pro-child attitudes and age covaried
positively with number of children, educational attainment did so negatively, whereas household income
was unrelated. Beyond the overall finding that more highly educated women have fewer children, analyses
revealed that the impact of education on fertility varies significantly between countries. Of the macro-level
indicators, HDI had the strongest impact in that women in countries higher on HDI have fewer children.
Country-specific individualism predicted individual number of children positively after partialing for HDI. This
result was, however, not sustained, once female employment rates were included in the prediction model:
Against age-old folklore convictions, 25- to 34-year-old woman in countries with a high female employment
rate have more not fewer children.
Key words: Hierarchical Linear Modeling, Fertility, Attitudes.
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1. Introduction
In the OECD, fertility rates have declined
considerably over the last three decades, to levels
well below those needed to secure generation re-
placement. Overall decline in fertility rates occurs with
sizable differences between countries. In some the
decline started earlier but then stabilized. Elsewhere
the decline commenced later but progressed faster
(Bagavos & Martin, 2001). Additionally, one finds an
increase in mean ages of women at first childbirth,
and postponement of childbearing comes along
with cross-nationally different trends of fertility-
recuperation at higher ages. Furthermore, one
finds systematic differences in the level of fertility
rates among women by employment status and a
few other characteristics, indicating a differential
impact of institutional effects brought about by
measures taken in the educational and the
occupational system (Blossfeld & Huinink, 1991).
All in all, changes in fertility rates over the last three
decades in the OECD show high variability
(Sleebos, 2003).
The goal of the present paper is threefold.
First, we present descriptive evidence showing
the observable changes in fertility rates since
1970 in some 25 member countries of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Secondly, we draw on
existing theories for explaining decreasing rates of
childbearing from a cross-cultural perspective to
outline a conceptual framework for empirical
investigation and generate hypotheses. In the third
part we use the World Value Survey (WVS) data to
test our hypotheses in multi-level analyses. In
order to analyze cross-cultural variability in fertility
behavior and its predictability, we include not only
individual-level WVS data but also country-level
context variables. Concludingly, we outline possi-
bilities for future research.
Having Children: Trends across Time and
Cross-cultural Differences. Trends in total fertility
rates (TFR3) have undergone profound changes
over the last 30 years. They declined from an
average value of 2.4 children per woman in 1970
to 1.6 in 2002. Only Mexico and Turkey show
values above the replacement level of 2.1. Figure
1 gives an overview of TFR in the OECD. 
A look at absolute TFR differences between
1970 and today (details omitted here) shows that
the average reduction of total fertility rates was
at slightly above 1 in the entire OECD. Between-
country variability in TFR-decrease was, however,
immense, with Finland remaining almost stable
since 1970 and Mexico reporting a decrease by
more than 4.5 children.
Conceptual Considerations. In cross-cultural
analyses of the variability and predictability of
fertility behavior three major problems arise: First,
the theoretical framework and the hypotheses
derived from it must accommodate the specific
situation in each cultural context, the cultural unit
of analysis typically being the country. In principle,
conceptual considerations must allow for a
differential per-country relationship between
variables. Of course, instruments and operationali-
zations must furthermore allow valid measurement
of equivalent constructs across countries. Finally,
one has to be able to obtain data from a sufficient
number of units on the aggregate level: Studies
with only few countries will not allow for a test of
hypotheses that assume both country-level and
individual-level factors influencing fertility behavior.
Only a multi-level approach accommodates a
culture-specific prediction of fertility behavior while
at the same time allowing for an overarching cross-
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3. The Total Fertility Rate gives the average number of children that a woman gives birth to in her lifetime,
assuming that the prevailing rates at a given time remain unchanged. The TFR does not give information about
the final birth rates since they estimate the reproductive behavior of women who have not ended childbearing. If the
age of first births is increasing, trends based on total fertility rates exaggerate the decline in childbearing. Thus, a
better —but not as common— indicator of long term trends is provided by data on completed fertility rates.
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cultural prediction (Nauck & Schönpflug, 1997). It
emphasizes that for explaining phenomena like the
fertility rates of different countries, effects on dif-
ferent levels need to be recognized: structural
properties of the cultural context as well as, among
others, individual attitudes (Mayer, 2004).
On the macro level the cultural and institutional
structure, as well as the culture-specific political and
economic conditions determine the opportunities
and constraints of individual behavior. Cultural norms
affect the probability for having a child, as does the
political and economic context (Lesthaeghe &
Moors, 2002). Differing welfare systems have an
impact on fertility: Faced with a decline in fertility
rates, European welfare states have been undergoing
major demographic change. The Nordic countries
and France have, however, quite successfully
embarked upon this trend by supporting families
with a moderate so-called defamilialization strategy,
while Germany and Southern Europe have, in
principle, continued to depend on welfare
production by families (Esping-Andersen, 1999),
and only recently modified their policy.
Defamilialization means providing families
with services like daycare facilities, advisory
services, or support in caring for the elderly.
Families are disburdened, which allows (both)
parents to remain in the workforce and engage
in other non-family activities. Whereas the Nordic
and French models foster lower rates of child-
lessness and larger families because they offer a
chance for reconciling work and family, families in
other countries are smaller and childlessness
figures are higher.
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4. Country abbreviations are internet country codes. 
Figure 1
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On the micro-level, one looks at the individual
and its resources (acquired, for example, through
education) and psychosocial dispositions (often
assessed in the form of attitudes). The value-of-
children approach (Hoffman & Hoffman, 1973;
Nauck, 2001) assumes that children provide a
certain utility for their parents or family, which can
be differentiated into three basic types, namely
economic, psychological, and socio-normative
benefits. Numerous theories discuss the
importance of attitudes for the prediction of
behavior, the most influential one probably being
the so-called theory of planned behavior (Ajzen,
1991). That approach distinguishes between
attitudes, subjective norms, and the perceived
behavioral control as determinants of a behavior
intention and the subsequent behavior.
A multi-level approach simultaneously includes
the structural and cultural context as well as
personal resources as determinants of an individual
behavioral decision. It is particularly useful for
cross-cultural comparisons, but it also bears
pragmatic disadvantages insofar as multi-level
modeling is often confronted with strong limitations
of data availability: Macro-level indicators are
frequently lacking, and equivalent micro-level
measures across numerous countries are also
infrequent. This means that in a multi-level analysis
of the prediction and variability in fertility behavior
across countries, one has to make substantial
compromises with regard to measures included
in one’s analyses.
In addition, the very design of studies meant
to predict fertility behavior is a point of compromise.
A fully valid prediction of childbearing calls for
panel data, in which data on structural properties
of a social entity and data, for example, on fertility
attitudes are obtained at one point in time, and the
behavior itself, namely the bearing or not-bearing
of a child, is corroborated at a later time. More-
over, data from the (potential) mother and father
would ideally have to be obtained (Lesthaeghe,
2002). Such dyadic, multi-country panel data are
currently not available. Only one-shot studies, i.e.,
studies in which data on predictors of the behavior
under scrutiny and the behavior itself (here
childbearing) are available from a multitude of
countries and will have to be utilized here.
In the present study, we focus more on
macro-level indicators, and less so on the actual
individual-level decision-making process of
having or not having children. We additionally
confine our analyses to a segment of the
population for whom the decision-making process
and the behavior itself (having or not having one or
more children) are not separated by a long time-
stretch: We focus on mid-adulthood and include
only the 25- to 34-year-old women of all studied
countries in our analyses. For this population
segment the generation of attitudes toward
childbearing and the childbearing itself occur
fairly close together time-wise and contextual
indicators also stem from the same historic era.
Would one include older segments of the
population, child birth would often have occurred
many years or even decades before, but
childbearing attitudes would be current attitudes.
In light of the above-described decline of
fertility rates across all OECD countries, the most
interesting dependent variable seems to be the
number of children an individual has.
Hypotheses. On the individual level we include
proximal information on individual resources and
on psychosocial dispositions in our prediction
model. As resource variables in a very wide sense
we include education, the self-assessed income
level of the household to which an individual
belongs, and age 5. As a proxy for an individual’s
psychosocial dispositions for childbearing we
include childbearing attitudes.
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5. Age could, of course, also be seen as a more technical control variable, but seeing it as a resource variable
is also plausible, because experience and knowledge and as result also economic resources of an individual do
increase with age in the childbearing cohorts of a society.
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The influence of education on fertility rates
has often been investigated. A strong argument
why educational level of individuals should be
related to fertility comes from the so-called New
Home Economics approach, which argues that
with increasing education opportunity costs of
children increase, in turn negatively impacting the
decision for having children (Becker, 1991), an
assumption corroborated for many different
countries (Billari & Philipov, 2004). It is, however,
an open question whether education has a
differential impact across countries and, in case
variation in educational effects exists, which
context variables are responsible for such
variability. Our first hypothesis, thus, reads: The
number of children a woman has is negatively
related to individual educational attainment (H1).
With regard to economic status the literature
is more equivocal. Ewer and Crimmins-Gardner
(1978) e.g., have shown that increasing individual
economic resources of women tend to covary
negatively with the number of children. This can
be explained in the way that the higher your
economic resources are, the greater a potential
loss of resources a child may cause. However,
other studies have not found a clear relationship
between individual economic resources and
fertility; for the US, DiPrete and McManus (2000)
report no relationship between private household
income and number of children, while for Ger-
many they do find such a relationship. We assume
that a negative relationship between household in-
come and fertility continues to exist (H2).
For age our somewhat trivial assumption is
that number of children born to a woman increases
with it (H3).
Lastly, on the individual level, we include
attitudes towards children and the question if a
woman needs children for self-fulfillment. In
accordance with the theory of planned behavior
(Ajzen, 1991), which defines the influence of
attitudes on behavioral intentions and subsequently
on behavior, we assume that there is a positive
correlation between positive attitudes toward
having children and actually having a child (H4).
But here we have to point out a restriction pertain-
ing to the question of modeling predictors of
behavior. We use the World Value Survey for our
analyses that does not contain panel data, which
means that we cannot measure the attitudes
before the intention or behavior of the respondent.
But we assume that this attitude is stable enough
and measures more a general outlook on life, in-
ternalized in the relevant phases of socialization.
Rijken & Liefbroer (2009), for example, argue that
the internalized experience in one’s own family
and witnessed parental behavior influence future
decisions for childbearing. Facing the lack of
suitable data, we have to take into account this re-
striction.
Macro-sociological and demographic research
has insisted that beyond individual resources
structural and mentality differences between
countries have an influence on individual child-
bearing behavior: The cultural climate vis-à-vis
children is assumed to impact fertility (Boehnke,
2007). In addition to attitudes on the individual
level we, therefore, add a number of macro-level
variables to our predictive model that characterize
the present normative situation in the country.
We, first, refer to the well-known measure-
ment of Individualism and Collectivism (Hofstede,
2001) and assume that degree of societal
individualism influences female fertility rates
negatively (H5), because in individualized societies
self-actualization is more rewarding, than
fulfillment through having children (Gouveia &
Ros, 2000).
Another indicator discussed in the literature is
also taken from Hofstede’s work, namely Ma-
sculinity/Femininity. We assume that in societies
high in masculinity, women will have more children
(H6). In formulating this assumption, we follow
Hofstede as well as a study by Berry (1989).
These studies let it seem plausible that in
societies in which masculinity is high, women’s
destiny is seen as lying first and foremost in
having children and that consequentially women
in such societies, as norms there are highly
dominated by men, will fulfill these expectations
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to a higher degree than women in societies high
in femininity.
Beyond these indicators of a specific cultural
climate, we include a number of structural
variables as predictors for variations in fertility
behavior.
For once, we include the Human Development
Index (HDI), an index encompassing a country’s
gross domestic product, its life expectancy at birth,
its literacy rate, and its overall enrolment figures in
the educational system, weighted in a complex way.
The variable assesses the overall societal prosperity.
Here our hypothesis is that the higher HDI, the lower
a fertility rate of a country will be (H7). In line with the
value-of-children research (Kagitcibasi & Esmer,
1980), the argument here is that in high HDI
societies children are not needed for a family’s
socioeconomic well-being, e.g., in old age, as the
society is sufficiently affluent to provide support for
individuals with few or no children, so that rational
reasons to have children are less pronounced.
Further macro-level variables are assumed to
add to the prediction of fertility rates. First, it is of-
ten assumed that fertility rates are higher in
countries with a high rate of legal marriages (as op-
posed to common-law marriages and other family
arrangements). As Sobotka (2003) reported, this
indeed is the case particularly in Central and Eastern
European OECD countries, while comprehensive
data and analyses do not seem to exist. Other
authors (Kohler, Billari, & Ortega, 2002) claim that
the traditional relationship between marriage rates
and fertility rate has dwindled or even been
reversed. We follow the original general assumption
in hypothesizing that fertility rates are higher in
countries with a high proportion of legal marriages
(H8), because there, the norm of having children—
and consequentially more frequently of indeed
having children—is higher.
Two more macro-level indicators are more
closely related to the structural context of child-
bearing and rearing. We include the average
female participation in the job market as one
further macro-level predictor of fertility. Here, once
again, available research is not consentaneous,
several studies reporting lower childbearing rates
in countries with a high female employment rate,
while there also are studies that do not see a
connection. For heuristic purposes we side with
the traditional view discussed by Weller (1977),
and assume that the higher the female employment
rate in a country, the lower the individual propensity
to bear children (H9).
A final macro-level indicator in our model is
a country’s average enrolment in childcare
institutions. As discussed most extensively in the
work of Esping-Andersen (1999), high levels of
availability of non-family childcare, or as he terms
it, defamilialization of childcare, offer a chance for
women to combine work and family and thereby
allow them to more easily come to positive fertility
decisions (H10).
Generally speaking, the goal of the present
paper is to combine structural macro-level and
resource and attitude-related individual-level
measures in explaining low but differing birth
rates in OECD countries.
2. Method
Sample
The present study includes women between
the ages of 25 and 34. We use data from the World
Value Survey (WVS) collected in the years 1999
and 2000 (Inglehart et al., 2004). The mean age of
the entire sample (N=4069) is 29.56. Out of the
countries available only the 27 participating OECD
countries were selected. Two OECD countries
(Korea and Iceland) could not be included as there
were missing data for two of the macro-indicators
to be included in our analyses. The remaining 25
countries are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United States,
East, and West Germany, which we keep separate,
because earlier studies (Boehnke, 2007) have
shown that fertility behavior in the two formerly
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separate German states continues to be distinctly
different, particularly among academically trained
women.
Instruments
Our dependent variable is the number of
children a woman has at the time of surveying.
As predictors on the individual level, we include
age, level of educational attainment (8 categories
from “no formal education” to “university-level
education with degree”), the self-rated household
income of the surveyed woman standardized
within country (10 categories from low to high),
and attitudes toward having children (“Do you
think that a woman has to have children in order to
be fulfilled or is this not necessary?”). Answering
options for this attitudinal question were “no”, and
“yes”, coded “0”, and “1”.
Our macro-level predictors were Hofstede’s
individualism/collectivism and masculinity/femini-
nity indices (Hofstede, 2001), the country’s
Human Development Index (UNDP, 2000), the
crude marriage rate (number of marriages per
1000 inhabitants) (UN, 2005), the female employ-
ment rate (percentage of employed females in
working-age cohorts), and the enrolment in
childcare institutions (percent of children under
3 enrolled in formal childcare), the latter two taken
from OECD files (OECD, 2006; 2007). Table 1
documents the included scores for all countries,
and also documents the average number of
children reported by the surveyed women.
Analytic Procedures
We used Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM)
for our analyses. HLM is in essence a two-level
linear regression approach, where individual-level
regression analyses are performed and the
obtained coefficients are then inserted into
country-level regression analyses (Raudenbush &
Bryk, 2002; Hox, 2002). Details on equations are
omitted here6; all variables were centered at their
grand means.
3. Results
Table 2 documents a series of HLMs, starting
with a so-called empty model (Model 1) that gives
information on the overall individual and country-
level variance. The average number of children
across the included countries was 1.25. Variance
components show that of the between-country
variance 8% are explainable. Model 2 introduces
the individual resource variables education,
income, and age as well as the attitude variable.
As assumed we find that a positive, a pro-child
attitude goes together with a higher number of
children (0.2047, p<0.001). Consistent with our
hypothesis, education has a negative coefficient
(–0.205, p<0.001), meaning that women with
higher education have fewer children. Age has a
positive coefficient (0.125, p<0.001) as expected,
with increasing age the number of children
increases. No influence of income was found.
The next model (Model 3) includes again all
individual-level variables; this time the coefficients
are allowed to vary across countries. Including
the four individual variables and allowing them to
vary across the 25 countries reduces the
unexplained between-county variance by about
35% and the individual-level variance by about
20%. Variance components for the education
slope are significant (p<0.01), meaning that the
relationship between education and fertility varies
between countries. While we find for example no
relation between the two in the Czech Republic,
in Canada or Spain there is a rather strong link
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6. They can be obtained from the first author.
7. As is typical for HLM, we use unstandardized coefficients, which mean that if the predictor variable is
increased by 1 unit, the dependent variable changes by the documented amount.
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between fertility and education. 
In the next step (Model 4) the first three higher
order variables in the order of our hypotheses are
introduced. The coefficient for individualism is
0.010 (p<0.05), meaning that in more individualist
countries the number of children is higher. This
appears surprising in light of our hypothesis that
assumed the opposite relationship. It must be
pointed out that this coefficient is adjusted for the
degree of prosperity of a country (HDI). This
suggests that when looking at the “pure” ideational
component of individualism (partialed for the hu-
man development component), individualism
fosters female fertility. For HDI per se (the
How many children? ◆ 123
Table 2
HLMs for Individual and County-level Variables
Country Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Intercepta 1.246*** 1.318*** 1.298*** 1.283*** 1.296***
Individualism 0.010* 0.005
Masculinity 0.003 0.004
HDI –3.354** –3.880**
Marriage Rate 0.027
Female Employment Rate 0.017**
Enrolment in Childcare –0.002
Pro-Child Attitude 0.204*** 0.182** 0.166** 0.169**
Education Level –0.205*** –0.176*** –0.177*** –0.175***
Household Income –0.011 –0.003 –0.002 –0.002
Age 0.125*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.127***
Interceptb 0.1266*** 0.0779*** 0.0816*** 0.0467*** 0.0368***
Attitude slopec 0.0134 0.0130 0.0131
Education slope 0.0029** 0.0032** 0.0037**
Income slope 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010
Age slope 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
Level 1 Varianced 1.4464 1.1941 1.1640 1.1472 1.1624
Deviance Coefficient 12772.09 9236.18 9185.72 9175.74 9165.40 
(3) (7) (21) (24) (27)
*p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001
a. The technical term “intercept” can here be understood as the mean of the dependent  variable if all predictors
are 0.
b. In this context, the technical term “intercept” refers to the variance still to be explained after the inclusion of
the model variables; for Model 1, the so-called “empty model”, this, thus, is the overall variation of the number
of children between countries.
c. The technical term “slope” indicates the variability of country-specific micro-level variable effects.
d. Coefficients documented in this line report the estimated variance on the micro-level, meaning the variance
between the women included here.
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comprehensive prosperity of a country) we found
the negative relationship we assumed (–3.354,
p<0.01), the higher education, life expectancy,
and the standard of living of a country the lower
the number of children. For masculinity no
significant effect was found.
Model 5 indicates that the effect of the
prosperity of a country remains significant, but not
that of individualism if women’s employment rate,
the country-specific marriage rate, and the childcare
enrolment rate are included in the model. The
coefficient for women’s employment rate is 0.017
(p<0.01): In countries where it is more common that
women work, the number of children is not lower
but higher. For enrolment rates in formal childcare
as well as marriage rates no significant results were
found. Including all of these variables reduces unex-
plained country-level variance by 71% and
individual-level variance by 20%.
As mentioned earlier, the model shows a
significant slope for education, i.e., a differential
influence of individual education on fertility between
countries.8
4. Discussion
The study examined the influence of individual-
level as well as macro-level predictors of
childbearing among 25-34-year-old women in 25
OECD countries. It was assumed that—on the
micro-level—age, education, economic status, and
the attitude towards children, and—on the macro-
level—country-specific individualism, masculinity,
economic development, marriage rate, female
employment, and enrolment in childcare would
influence the number of children a woman has. For
the individual-level predictors our hypotheses were
confirmed for all variables but household income.
There seemingly is no linear relationship between
the income of the household of a woman and the
number of children she has. Growing older, having
less of an education, and endorsing the position
that children give one’s life a sense, do, however,
positively predict a woman’s number of children. In
addition to being an overall negative predictor of
fertility, the impact of education of the number of
children a woman bears in the OECD varies
significantly between countries. Further research
is, however, needed as to why this is the case:
None of the macro-level variables included here
offers a suggestion; neither of them significantly
predicts the between-country differences in the im-
port of education for childbearing.
For the aggregate-level variables results were
quite diverse. While we found clear evidence for
an influence of societal economic development on
childbearing —the greater a country’s prosperity,
the lower the number of children women have—
the influence of individualism and masculinity are
indistinct. While no influence of masculinity could
be corroborated, country-specific individualism
seems to —in principle— covary positively with
the number of children a woman has, a finding
contrary to our predictions. This effect loses
significance, however, once the country-specific
female employment rate is introduced into our
model (which correlates both with individualism
and economic development9). Female employment
is positively related to fertility, also contrary to the
—classical— assumption. Greece, Italy, and
Spain where we find a comparably low female
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8. HLM allows for an exploratory analysis of macro-level indicators that could have an influence on the variability
of the slopes. Substantively this means that one can analyze whether any of the available macro-level variables
predict the degree of variability in the predictive capacity of education on fertility. Unfortunately none of the included
predictors turned out to be a promising higher-level variable impacting these slopes. HLM also offers the possibility
to compare the model fit using a so-called deviance statistic based on ¯2. Comparative analyses secure that each
of the Model 2 to 5 has a better fit to the data than the previous one, meaning the contribution of the added variables
and slopes for explaining the variation of the outcome is non-negligible.
9. See appendix for correlation matrix.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 24/12/2020 05:14:14 |
employment rate and at the same time a low
fertility rate might be examples that the traditional
male breadwinner model might indeed have
changed while the frequency of possibilities
offered for combining work and family haven’t
(yet). A closer inspection of the data does,
however, reveal that there are outliers: For Mexico
and Turkey the generally found relationship does
not hold true, here we find a comparatively high
mean number of children, combined with a
comparatively low female employment rate. 
It should be noted that enrolment in institu-
tional childcare, as a proxy for the availability of
early-age childcare in a society, does not impact
women’s childbearing behavior.
What are the essential findings of the present
study? First and foremost: That classical “folklore”
or common-sense knowledge is wrong. Countries
with a high female employment rate are not the
ones that have low fertility rates: The contrary is
true. Adherence to individualist values in an
OECD country does not impact fertility negatively
if a country’s prosperity is taken into account.
Sustainable wealth, i.e., high scores of a country
on the Human Development Index, does, at the
same time, have a strong impact on fertility. In our
opinion this finding supports the main assumption
of the value-of-children approach: In countries
where children have a low economic utility,
because the general prosperity is high enough to
allow the average citizen to facilitate his or her
survival regardless of the number of children,
fewer children are indeed born. Furthermore,
there is no evidence that it is the underclass that
has more children: No relationship between
household income and number of children born
was found.
Having reviewed the non-findings, the question,
of course, remains what was found beyond the
huge effect of a country’s prosperity that was
already discussed? The central finding here is the
very strong effect of individual education on
female fertility, which at the same time varies
between countries. Future research should
address the reasons for both the strong impact of
education as well as for its cross-national varia-
bility. While the latter question is more a question
for sociologists, the question of why higher
education prevents women from having children
may not only interest sociologists but also
psychologists: Is education more a variable that
just changes the odds in expectancy-value
equations, or does education also change the
ideational context of the decision for or against a
child? Another big question for psychologist, of
course, also remains unanswered after the
present study, namely how positive attitudes
towards having children develop during
childhood and adolescents. Hardly any research
is available in this field.
Finally arguments against the validity of our
findings need to be discussed. One could, argue
that including 25-34-old women in a study on
predictors of the number of children is not the
wisest decision since in view of rising mean age
of first births the dependent variable might
measure the degree of early childbearing rather
than the number of children per se. Arguments
against this assumption are that there is only a
minor increase of mean age at higher birth orders
(Sobotka, 2003) and recuperation at higher ages
is only partial (D’Addio & d’Ercole, 2005).
Nevertheless, further research as to this question
seems advisable. One could repeat the calculation
of the models advocated in the present study for
35-44-year-old women, using then, of course,
macro-level indicators from earlier times, when on
average 40-year-olds made decisions for or
against having children. This task must, however,
remain for future research.
Another criticism against the study can
obviously be voiced against the relative arbi-
trariness of the selection of predictors both on the
individual and on the aggregate level. Here
readers have to be reminded that availability of
data for some 25 countries is the major argument
for the given choice of variables, but, of course,
the inclusion of further conceptually grounded
variables addressing the individual decision
process for having or not having children would
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be highly desirable. May such variables be
included in future waves of the World Value
Survey.
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Appendix
Table: Correlation Matrix of Variables Included in Multi-Level Analyses
Individual-Level Variables
Age Household Education Pro-child 
Income Level Attitude
Household Income 0.075***
Education Level –0.032* 0.357***
Pro-child Attitude 0.005 –0.171*** –0.169***
Number of children 0.277*** –0.179*** –0.404*** 0.146***
Country-Level Variables
Individualism Masculinity HDI Marriage Female Enrolment 
Rate Employment in Childcare
Rate
Masculinity –0.099
HDI 0.568** –0.272
Marriage Rate –0.290 –0.013 –0.328
Female Employment 
Rate 0.483* –0.267 0.568** –0.021
Enrolment in Childcare 0.436* –0.587** 0.594** –0.037 0.617**
Number of Children 0.016 0.284 –0.553** 0.272 –0.072 –0.329
*p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001
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¶·Ú¿ÌÂÙÚÔÈ Úfi‚ÏÂ„Ë˜ ˆ˜ ÚÔ˜ ÙËÓ ·fiÎÙËÛË 
·È‰ÈÒÓ ·fi Á˘Ó·›ÎÂ˜ ÛÂ 25 ¯ÒÚÂ˜ ÙÔ˘ OO™A: 
Û‡ÁÎÚÈÛË ÌÂÙ·Í‡ ·ÙÔÌÈÎÔ‡ ÂÈ¤‰Ô˘ 
Î·È ÂÈ¤‰Ô˘ ¯ÒÚ·˜
MANDY BOEHNKE1
MICHAEL FELDHAUS2
∏ ·ÚÔ‡Û· ¤ÚÂ˘Ó·, ÛÂ 4069 Á˘Ó·›ÎÂ˜, ËÏÈÎ›·˜ 25-34 ÂÙÒÓ, ÛÂ 25 ¯ÒÚÂ˜ ÙÔ˘ √√™∞
Ô˘ Û˘ÌÌÂÙÂ›¯·Ó ÛÙËÓ ¶·ÁÎfiÛÌÈ· ŒÚÂ˘Ó· ÁÈ· ÙÈ˜ ∞Í›Â˜ (WVS), ÌÂÏÂÙ¿ ÌÂ ÙË
‚Ô‹ıÂÈ· ÙË˜ ¶ÔÏ˘Â›Â‰Ë˜ πÂÚ·Ú¯ÈÎ‹˜ ∞Ó¿Ï˘ÛË˜ °Ú·ÌÌÈÎÒÓ ÀÔ‰ÂÈÁÌ¿ÙˆÓ
(HLM), ÙÈ˜ ·Ú·Ì¤ÙÚÔ˘˜ Ô˘ Û¯ÂÙ›˙ÔÓÙ·È ÌÂ ÙÔÓ ·ÚÈıÌfi ÙˆÓ ·ÔÎÙÒÌÂÓˆÓ ·È‰ÈÒÓ ÛÙËÓ ÔÈÎÔÁ¤ÓÂÈ·.  ø˜
·ÙÔÌÈÎ¤˜ ·Ú¿ÌÂÙÚÔÈ Úfi‚ÏÂ„Ë˜ ÙÔ˘ ·ÚÈıÌÔ‡ ÙˆÓ ·È‰ÈÒÓ ¯ÚËÛÈÌÔÔÈ‹ıËÎ·Ó ÙÔ Â›Â‰Ô ÂÎ·›‰Â˘ÛË˜,
ÙÔ ÂÈÛfi‰ËÌ· ÛÙÔ ÓÔÈÎÔÎ˘ÚÈfi, Ë ËÏÈÎ›· Î·È ÔÈ ıÂÙÈÎ¤˜ ÛÙ¿ÛÂÈ˜ ÚÔ˜ ÙËÓ ·fiÎÙËÛË ·È‰ÈÒÓ, ÂÓÒ ˆ˜ ·Ú¿-
ÁÔÓÙÂ˜ Úfi‚ÏÂ„Ë˜ ÛÙÔ Â›Â‰Ô ÙË˜ ¯ÒÚ·˜ ¯ÚËÛÈÌÔÔÈ‹ıËÎ·Ó Ô ·ÙÔÌÈÎÈÛÌfi˜ Î·È Ë Û˘ÏÏÔÁÈÎfiÙËÙ· Î·Ù¿
Hofstede, Ô ∞Ó·Ù˘ÍÈ·Îfi˜ √ÈÎÔÓÔÌÈÎfi˜ ¢Â›ÎÙË˜ (HDI), Ô Ú˘ıÌfi˜ Á·ÌËÏÈfiÙËÙ·˜, Ô Ú˘ıÌfi˜ ÙË˜ Á˘Ó·ÈÎÂ›-
·˜ ··Û¯fiÏËÛË˜, Î·ıÒ˜ Î·È Ô Ú˘ıÌfi˜ ÙË˜ ·fiÎÙËÛË˜ ·È‰ÈÒÓ ÛÂ ÓÂ·Ú‹ ËÏÈÎ›·. ∆· Â˘Ú‹Ì·Ù· ‰Â›¯ÓÔ˘Ó
fiÙÈ, ÛÂ ·ÙÔÌÈÎfi Â›Â‰Ô, ÔÈ ÛÙ¿ÛÂÈ˜ ˘¤Ú ÙË˜ ·fiÎÙËÛË˜ ·È‰ÈÒÓ Î·È Ë ËÏÈÎ›· Û˘ÌÌÂÙ·‚¿ÏÏÔÓÙ·È ıÂÙÈÎ¿
ÌÂ ÙÔÓ ·ÚÈıÌfi ÙˆÓ ·È‰ÈÒÓ, ÂÓÒ ·ÓÙ›ıÂÙ·, ÙÔ ˘„ËÏfi ÂÎ·È‰Â˘ÙÈÎfi Â›Â‰Ô Û¯ÂÙ›˙ÂÙ·È ·ÚÓËÙÈÎ¿ ÌÂ ÙËÓ ·fi-
ÎÙËÛË ·È‰ÈÒÓ. ∆Ô ÂÈÛfi‰ËÌ· ÙÔ˘ ÓÔÈÎÔÎ˘ÚÈÔ‡ ‰ÂÓ Û¯ÂÙ›˙ÂÙ·È Î·ıfiÏÔ˘ ÌÂ ÙÔ Ú˘ıÌfi ·fiÎÙËÛË˜ ·È‰ÈÒÓ.
¶¤Ú· ·fi ÙÔ ÁÂÓÈÎfi Â‡ÚËÌ· fiÙÈ ÔÈ Á˘Ó·›ÎÂ˜ ÌÂ ˘„ËÏfiÙÂÚÔ Â›Â‰Ô ÂÎ·›‰Â˘ÛË˜ ·ÔÎÙÔ‡Ó ÏÈÁfiÙÂÚ· ·È-
‰È¿, Ù· ·ÔÙÂÏ¤ÛÌ·Ù· ÙË˜ ¤ÚÂ˘Ó·˜ ‰Â›¯ÓÔ˘Ó fiÙÈ Ë Â›‰Ú·ÛË ÙË˜ ÂÎ·›‰Â˘ÛË˜ ÛÙË ÁÔÓÈÌfiÙËÙ· ÔÈÎ›ÏÏÂÈ ÛÂ
ÛËÌ·ÓÙÈÎfi Â›Â‰Ô ÌÂÙ·Í‡ ¯ˆÚÒÓ. ∞Ó¿ÌÂÛ· ÛÙÈ˜ ·Ú·Ì¤ÙÚÔ˘˜ ÙÔ˘ Ì·ÎÚÔ-ÂÈ¤‰Ô˘, Ô ∞Ó·Ù˘ÍÈ·Îfi˜
√ÈÎÔÓÔÌÈÎfi˜ ¢Â›ÎÙË˜ Ê·›ÓÂÙ·È Ó· ·ÛÎÂ› ÙËÓ ÈÛ¯˘ÚfiÙÂÚË Â›‰Ú·ÛË ÁÈ· ÙËÓ ·fiÎÙËÛË ÏÈÁfiÙÂÚˆÓ ·È‰ÈÒÓ ÛÂ
¯ÒÚÂ˜ ÌÂ ˘„ËÏfiÙÂÚÔ ·Ó·Ù˘ÍÈ·Îfi ‰Â›ÎÙË. ∂ÈÏ¤ÔÓ, ·Ê·ÈÚÒÓÙ·˜ ÛÙ·ÙÈÛÙÈÎ¿ ÙËÓ Â›‰Ú·ÛË ÙÔ˘ ∞Ó·Ù˘ÍÈ·-
ÎÔ‡ √ÈÎÔÓÔÌÈÎÔ‡ ¢Â›ÎÙË, Ô ·ÙÔÌÈÎÈÛÌfi˜ ÛÂ ÌÈ· ¯ÒÚ· Ê·›ÓÂÙ·È Ó· ÚÔ‚Ï¤ÂÈ ıÂÙÈÎ¿ ÙËÓ ·fiÎÙËÛË ·È‰ÈÒÓ.
∆Ô Â‡ÚËÌ· ·˘Ùfi, ·Ó Î·È ‰ÂÓ ˘ÔÛÙËÚ›˙ÂÙ·È, Û˘ÌÂÚÈÏ·Ì‚¿ÓÂÙ·È ÛÙË Û˘Ó¿ÚÙËÛË Úfi‚ÏÂ„Ë˜ Î·È ‰È·ÈÛÙÒ-
ÓÂÙ·È fiÙÈ, ·Ú¿ ÙÈ˜ ·Ú·‰ÔÛÈ·Î¤˜ ÂÔÈı‹ÛÂÈ˜, ÛÙÈ˜ Á˘Ó·›ÎÂ˜ ËÏÈÎ›·˜ 25-34 ÂÙÒÓ ÌÂ ˘„ËÏfi ‚·ıÌfi Â·Á-
ÁÂÏÌ·ÙÈÎ‹˜ ··Û¯fiÏËÛË˜, Ô Ú˘ıÌfi˜ ·fiÎÙËÛË˜ ·È‰ÈÒÓ ‰ÂÓ Â›Ó·È ÙfiÛÔ ÌÈÎÚfi˜ fiÛÔ ı· ·Ó·ÌÂÓfiÙ·Ó.  
§¤ÍÂÈ˜-ÎÏÂÈ‰È¿: πÂÚ·Ú¯ÈÎ‹ ·Ó¿Ï˘ÛË ÁÚ·ÌÌÈÎÒÓ ˘Ô‰ÂÈÁÌ¿ÙˆÓ, °ÔÓÈÌfiÙËÙ·, ™Ù¿ÛÂÈ˜.
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